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On this pageStart with the denominator, because almost nobody publishes oneThe one place a real decline shows up is the entry levelFour industry series that fell, and what each of them can seeFour that did not fall, including two where the opposite happenedThe series that is quoted most and belongs to neither sideWhat none of these numbers can seeWhat this does not establishEverything cited here
Notes›How many jobs has AI actually replaced so far?

The question

How many jobs has AI actually taken? Every verified number

There is no single number, and the honest reason is not that the data is missing — it is that almost every published figure counts something other than a job. Here is each one we could check, and what it actually counts.

2026-09-1320 citations, all linked

Start with the denominator, because almost nobody publishes one

Most reporting about AI and work is a list of employers doing something. What is missing from that list is how many employers there are. The US Census Bureau's Business Trends and Outlook Survey supplement is the only nationally representative count we have found: during November 2025 to January 2026, 18% of US firms used AI in a business function — 32% when weighted by employment, because larger firms adopt more.

The same survey asked about employment, and its answer is the one least often quoted: among firms that use AI, 95% report no AI-related change in headcount at all. Of the rest, increases (2.3%) slightly outnumber decreases (2.0%). What is common is not labour substitution but capital substitution — 16% of AI-using firms replaced existing software or equipment with an AI-integrated version.

Two cautions belong with those numbers, and both come from the survey's own authors: the question was rewritten between supplements from AI used in producing goods or services to AI used in any business function, so the series cannot be read cleanly across time; and the share of firms reporting a large number of replaced tasks rose from 2.5% to 7%, which the authors say may itself partly reflect the rewording.

This section rests on
  • Census BTOS supplement: 18% of US firms used AI in a business function, and 57% of those in three functions or fewer
  • Census BTOS supplement: 16% of AI-using US firms replaced existing software or equipment with AI-integrated solutions

The one place a real decline shows up is the entry level

Payroll microdata behind the ADP series, analysed in the Stanford 'Canaries in the Coal Mine' work, finds employment of 22-to-25-year-olds in the two most AI-exposed occupation quintiles down about 11% between November 2022 and June 2026 — while employment of the same age group in the three least-exposed quintiles rose about 10%. The comparison is the point, and it is between young workers in different kinds of job, not between young and old. Senior workers show no comparable gap, and the authors state plainly that they find no economy-wide job displacement.

We attached that finding to four occupations separately rather than summarising it once, because the paper's unit is an exposure quintile, not an occupation — and a reader who works in one of them deserves to see the scope note on their own page rather than a headline on ours.

This section rests on
  • Employment of 22-25-year-olds in the two most AI-exposed occupation quintiles fell about 11% from November 2022 to June 2026, while the least-exposed quintiles grew about 10%
  • Employment of 22-25-year-olds in the two most AI-exposed occupation quintiles fell about 11% from November 2022 to June 2026, while the least-exposed quintiles grew about 10%
  • Employment of 22-25-year-olds in the two most AI-exposed occupation quintiles fell about 11% from November 2022 to June 2026, while the least-exposed quintiles grew about 10%
  • Employment of 22-25-year-olds in the two most AI-exposed occupation quintiles fell about 11% from November 2022 to June 2026, while the least-exposed quintiles grew about 10%

Four industry series that fell, and what each of them can see

US telephone call-centre employment went from 385,100 in November 2022 to 277,500 in June 2026. US graphic design services rose for seven months after ChatGPT's release and then fell back to its April-2020 level, with the turn in mid-2023 rather than on release day. Advertising and public relations peaked in February 2023 and fell about 5%. UK agency job postings for writing roles fell from roughly one in six to roughly one in thirty.

Read the advertising and graphic-design series side by side: over the same months one fell about 5% and the other about 13%. The gap between two adjacent industries is itself a finding, and it is the kind of thing a single headline number erases.

Every one of these is an industry series, not an occupation series, and that gap is stated on each record. A call centre's payroll includes its managers and its cleaners; a design agency's payroll does not include the freelancer it stopped commissioning.

This section rests on
  • US telephone call-centre employment fell from 385,100 in November 2022 to 277,500 in June 2026, a decline of 28% — but it had already fallen 17% in the 41 months before that
  • US graphic design services employment rose for seven months after ChatGPT's release to 59,300, then fell to 50,100 by December 2025 — its level at the depth of the 2020 shutdown
  • US advertising and public relations employment peaked at 503,200 in February 2023 and fell every year after, reaching 476,000 in August 2026
  • Writing roles fell from about one in six of UK agency job postings to about one in thirty by July 2026, while overall agency postings rose 24 percent

Four that did not fall, including two where the opposite happened

US legal services employment rose from 1,180,400 in November 2022 to 1,245,900 in August 2026, with no dip anywhere in the series — and its high is the most recent month. That sits on the same site as three records of courts sanctioning lawyers for filings built on fabricated citations. Both are true, and a page that publishes only one of them is selling something.

US architectural services employment was 203,900 in November 2022 and 204,200 in July 2026: flat across forty-five months. PCAOB economists reported registered audit firm staffing rising every year from 2015 through 2024. US diagnostic radiology training posts rose from 997 to 1,083 across five Matches — which matters because radiology is the occupation the field's most famous prediction named.

And two moved toward the occupation. Applications for commercial electrical apprenticeships rose more than 70%, driven by data-centre construction: the buildings AI runs in need electricians. China's translators association reported a 2025 workforce of 6.867 million with pay rising — in the occupation most often named as already gone.

This section rests on
  • US legal services employment rose from 1,180,400 in November 2022 to 1,245,900 in August 2026, its highest reading in the series
  • US architectural services employment was 203,900 in November 2022 and 204,200 in July 2026, never leaving a 201,100–207,500 band in between
  • PCAOB economists reported registered audit firm staffing rising every year from 2015 to 2024, and rising per dollar of client revenue, with non-CPA accountants growing about twice as fast as CPAs
  • US diagnostic radiology training posts rose from 997 to 1,083 across five Matches, filling at 98% or above throughout
  • Applications for commercial electrical apprenticeships rose more than 70% between 2022 and 2024 on the back of the data-centre buildout, while completion runs near 45%
  • China's translators association reported a 2025 workforce of 6.867 million and pay rising at over 60% of firms, while industry output edged down to 70.12 billion yuan

The series that is quoted most and belongs to neither side

US long-distance truckload trucking employment peaked in August 2022 — three months before ChatGPT was released — and fell with the freight cycle afterwards. The best-supported explanation in that series is demand, not automation. We record it for the same reason we record the rest: a site about AI and work that only publishes the series pointing one way cannot be believed when it says the opposite.

This section rests on
  • US long-distance truckload trucking employment peaked at 553,600 in August 2022, three months before ChatGPT, and was 501,400 in July 2026

What none of these numbers can see

Payroll series cannot see people who are not on a payroll. That is why we deliberately did not record the US couriers-and-messengers series for delivery riders: it looks relevant and it is flat, but platform riders are largely not payroll employees, so the series cannot see the people that page is about. For interpreters and translators there is no suitable US series at all and the alternative may not be compared across years — that is a blank, not a finding.

Counts of closures cannot see openings. In 2025 over 11,000 Chinese bank branches were approved to close — and over 8,400 to open. In the US, branches showed a net decline of only about 400 that year, roughly 1,400 closures against about 1,000 openings, with closures falling for a fourth year. Publishing the closure figure alone would have been accurate and misleading at once.

This section rests on
  • In 2025 over 11,000 Chinese bank branches were approved to close and over 8,400 to open, a net fall of about 2,000 — but rural credit cooperatives and village banks account for more than all of it
  • US bank branches showed a net decline of only 400 in 2025 — about 1,400 closures against more than 1,000 openings — the fourth consecutive year with fewer closures than the year before
  • Lloyds Banking Group announced 136 UK branch closures for May 2025–March 2026, citing 10 million fewer branch visits in 2024 and a 48% five-year fall in branch transactions

What this does not establish

This does not add up to a total and deliberately does not try. The figures here count different things — firms, payroll headcount in an industry, job postings, training posts, apprenticeship applications — and adding them would produce a number that means nothing. Nor is this a complete census of the evidence: it is what we have verified, which is weighted toward the United States, toward payroll employment, and toward sectors that publish. Nothing here estimates anyone's individual risk, and no series in it can tell you what will happen next.

Everything cited here

Each one opens the full record: its source and source tier, the dates, the scope it applies to, who verified it and what it does not establish.

  1. Census BTOS supplement: 18% of US firms used AI in a business function, and 57% of those in three functions or fewer — U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies (CES-WP-26-25)
  2. Census BTOS supplement: 16% of AI-using US firms replaced existing software or equipment with AI-integrated solutions — U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies (CES-WP-26-25)
  3. Employment of 22-25-year-olds in the two most AI-exposed occupation quintiles fell about 11% from November 2022 to June 2026, while the least-exposed quintiles grew about 10% — Stanford Digital Economy Lab — Brynjolfsson, Chandar & Chen, "Canaries in the Coal Mine?" (August 2026)
  4. Employment of 22-25-year-olds in the two most AI-exposed occupation quintiles fell about 11% from November 2022 to June 2026, while the least-exposed quintiles grew about 10% — Stanford Digital Economy Lab — Brynjolfsson, Chandar & Chen, "Canaries in the Coal Mine?" (August 2026)
  5. Employment of 22-25-year-olds in the two most AI-exposed occupation quintiles fell about 11% from November 2022 to June 2026, while the least-exposed quintiles grew about 10% — Stanford Digital Economy Lab — Brynjolfsson, Chandar & Chen, "Canaries in the Coal Mine?" (August 2026)
  6. Employment of 22-25-year-olds in the two most AI-exposed occupation quintiles fell about 11% from November 2022 to June 2026, while the least-exposed quintiles grew about 10% — Stanford Digital Economy Lab — Brynjolfsson, Chandar & Chen, "Canaries in the Coal Mine?" (August 2026)
  7. US telephone call-centre employment fell from 385,100 in November 2022 to 277,500 in June 2026, a decline of 28% — but it had already fallen 17% in the 41 months before that — US Bureau of Labor Statistics — Current Employment Statistics, telephone call centres (NAICS 561422), series CES6056142201
  8. US graphic design services employment rose for seven months after ChatGPT's release to 59,300, then fell to 50,100 by December 2025 — its level at the depth of the 2020 shutdown — US Bureau of Labor Statistics — Current Employment Statistics, all employees, graphic design services (NAICS 541430), series CES6054143001
  9. US advertising and public relations employment peaked at 503,200 in February 2023 and fell every year after, reaching 476,000 in August 2026 — US Bureau of Labor Statistics — Current Employment Statistics, all employees, advertising, public relations and related services (NAICS 5418), series CES6054180001
  10. Writing roles fell from about one in six of UK agency job postings to about one in thirty by July 2026, while overall agency postings rose 24 percent — The Drum(数据来自 Agency by Agency,基于 The Data City 与 Lightcast)
  11. US legal services employment rose from 1,180,400 in November 2022 to 1,245,900 in August 2026, its highest reading in the series — US Bureau of Labor Statistics — Current Employment Statistics, all employees, legal services (NAICS 5411), series CES6054110001
  12. US architectural services employment was 203,900 in November 2022 and 204,200 in July 2026, never leaving a 201,100–207,500 band in between — US Bureau of Labor Statistics — Current Employment Statistics, all employees, architectural services (NAICS 541310), series CES6054131001
  13. PCAOB economists reported registered audit firm staffing rising every year from 2015 to 2024, and rising per dollar of client revenue, with non-CPA accountants growing about twice as fast as CPAs — PCAOB Office of Economic and Risk Analysis — Data Points: Registered Firm Staffing Trends
  14. US diagnostic radiology training posts rose from 997 to 1,083 across five Matches, filling at 98% or above throughout — National Resident Matching Program — Results and Data: 2026 Main Residency Match
  15. Applications for commercial electrical apprenticeships rose more than 70% between 2022 and 2024 on the back of the data-centre buildout, while completion runs near 45% — Quartz
  16. China's translators association reported a 2025 workforce of 6.867 million and pay rising at over 60% of firms, while industry output edged down to 70.12 billion yuan — 中国翻译协会《2026中国翻译行业发展报告》发布稿(一手)
  17. US long-distance truckload trucking employment peaked at 553,600 in August 2022, three months before ChatGPT, and was 501,400 in July 2026 — US Bureau of Labor Statistics — Current Employment Statistics, all employees, general freight trucking, long-distance, truckload (NAICS 484121), series CES4348412101
  18. In 2025 over 11,000 Chinese bank branches were approved to close and over 8,400 to open, a net fall of about 2,000 — but rural credit cooperatives and village banks account for more than all of it — 中国证券报·中证网(依据金融监管总局「金融许可证信息」栏目统计)
  19. US bank branches showed a net decline of only 400 in 2025 — about 1,400 closures against more than 1,000 openings — the fourth consecutive year with fewer closures than the year before — The Financial Brand / Bancography
  20. Lloyds Banking Group announced 136 UK branch closures for May 2025–March 2026, citing 10 million fewer branch visits in 2024 and a 48% five-year fall in branch transactions — PYMNTS