LO
ConstraintCognitive automation2013-09-08
Pilots sometimes rely too much on automated systems and may be reluctant to intervene, and the aviation system is designed to rely on pilots mitigating risk, a 2013 FAA-industry review found
Airline pilotoccupation page →
Event date / reported
2013-09-08
Evidence stage
ConstraintFailure, rollback, regulation or cost is suppressing adoption. Can lower an assessment or widen its uncertainty.
Tasks this bears on
Working the automation
Programming the flight management system, choosing which level of automation to use, watching what it does, and deciding when it is doing something you did not ask for.
Being augmented✓ Evidence-backed
When two systems disagree
An engine failure, a decompression, a warning that contradicts another warning, weather that closes the destination after the point where you could have gone elsewhere.
Still human-led✓ Evidence-backed
Where this applies
The final report of a working group co-chaired by the US Federal Aviation Administration, an airline pilots' union and the airline trade association, drawing on accident, incident and normal-operations data. It finds that pilots sometimes rely too much on automated systems and may be reluctant to intervene; that flight management system programming and usage errors continue to occur; that pilots' ability to respond to failures may decrease, a particular concern for failures without procedures or checklists; that pilots mitigate safety and operational risks on a frequent basis and the aviation system is designed to rely on that mitigation; and that pilots were out of the control loop in over 50% of the accidents it reviewed. It is a review with recommendations, not a rule, and its data predate current aircraft.
What this means
The system is built on the assumption that pilots catch what goes wrong — and the same automation that makes flights routine makes them slower to step in. The abnormal case stays with people precisely because the design depends on them there.
What it does not yet show
A 2013 review of older data; it describes a pattern and makes recommendations, and does not measure current crews.
What you can check
Open the FAA-published report Operational Use of Flight Path Management Systems and find "the aviation system is designed to rely on that mitigation".
Does it change the assessment?
No. The impact index is never moved by a single event. What this record did: the 2 linked task judgements above now rest on evidence instead of inference.
Source
Performance-based operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee / Commercial Aviation Safety Team, Flight Deck Automation Working Group — Operational Use of Flight Path Management Systems, Final Report (cover letter dated September 8, 2013), published by the FAA · verified 2026-09-29 · Claude (VOLO agent) · interpreted 2026-09-29 · Claude (VOLO agent)
Primary source — published by the party that did this, or the authority of record. No co-signature needed.